groups in the EP is not unrelated to the concomitant increase in powers of the Parliament itself. Once a purely consultative institution, the EP is now a co-legislator with the European Council for the roughly 70 percent of legislation that is currently adopted within the codecision framework. We view it as also increasingly important to understand better the political space and policy positions through which these party groups compete.
In this paper we provide the first published estimates of the policy positions of the EP political groups using expert surveys, measured just before the European elections of June 2004. Previous attempts to infer these positions have used a variety of indirect methods such as codings of European election manifestos (Gabel and Hix 2004) , interviews with European elites (Arregui et al 2004) , surveys of MEPs (Thomassen et al 2004) and analyses of roll call votes (Hix et al 2005) . Our approach, by contrast, locates the party groups directly using predefined dimensions of policy by asking experts to place them on these dimensions. Using the estimates, we also characterize the policy space of EP party competition. Finally, we explore interesting patterns between EP party group positioning and the policy positions of each group's national party members.
In what follows, we discuss different approaches to measuring European policy positions, highlighting the benefits of expert survey methodology in the EP context. Next we describe our expert survey and then present and discuss the results. Following that, we use factor analysis to measure the dimensionality and components of the EP policy space, comparing our results to previous findings. Finally, we offer preliminary observations on the interaction of the EP groups and their national affiliates in terms of policy convergence, suggesting promising avenues for emerging research.
Measurement Approaches to European Policy Positions
Previous research has approached the problem of measuring the policy positions of the European party groups in several distinct ways. These approaches can be distinguished along two main dimensions, one associated with a substantive empirical focus and the other methodological.
As a matter of empirical focus, measurements of European party group positions have focused either on measuring the group positions of party groups in the EP directly, or on attempting to measure these indirectly through national-level measurements of the policy positions of member parties. Direct measures include analysis of roll-call votes (Hix et al. 2005; Noury 2002 ), Stokman and Thomson's (2004) expert interviews of political preferences on 66 Commission proposals, and a survey of MEPs (Thomassen et al 2004) , or analysis of European manifestos (Gabel and Hix 2004) .
Indirect measures rely on estimating the policy positions of party groups in the EP through direct measures of the positions of actors associated with EP party groups. After measuring the policy positions of these associated actors, the EP group position is assumed to be the average of their associated groups. For instance, the European Election surveys used by Thomassen and Schmidt (1997) measure the policy positions of mass publics and European Election candidates associated with EP party groups. Alternatively, expert surveys of national party positions, or CMP estimates based on national party manifestos, might be used to estimate EP party group positions. For reasons we highlight later in this paper, however, it should not be assumed that EP policy positions are always determined by the central tendency of their national party members or mass public positions. Indeed, we see this degree of convergence as one of the more interesting research questions to subject to empirical testing.
In terms of methodological divide, of course, there are numerous ways to measure the policy positions of political actors, including opinion surveys, expert surveys, expert interviews, analysis of party manifestos, and multi-dimensional scaling from roll-call votes.
Each method has advantages and disadvantages. Roll-call votes, for example, provide objective political actions from which parties can be inductively located on policy scales, using statistical techniques of multi-dimensional scaling. Roll call votes may suffer selection bias, however, since they may be called selectively depending on political outcome and only for certain issues. In addition, the substantive interpretation of the policy scales which they produce must be interpreted, and these are not always clear (see Hix et al 2005) .
The approach we use here is that of expert surveys: systematic placements by political experts of party groups on numerous pre-defined policy dimensions. Expert surveys have by now a well-established track record in political science for estimating the policy positions of political actors (see for example Castles and Mair 1984 , Laver and Hunt 1992 , Huber and Inglehart 1995 , Benoit and Laver 2005 although none has ever been used so far to estimate directly the policy positions of party groups in the European Parliament. Expert surveys as a research tool are often chosen for their economy: frequently a survey of experts represents the quickest and least expensive way to gather data on party positions. Given their relative ease of setup, it is a fairly simple matter to survey experts at any given time point, without the setup costs of a huge data-gathering project, detailed document coding, time-consuming interviews, or costly opinion surveys.
Besides the practical virtue of economy, expert surveys also have several compelling substantive advantages in the context of measuring the policy positions of European party groups. A first compelling advantage comes from the explicitly a priori approach to locating policy positions of the expert survey strategy. The underlying assumption is that the key substantive policy dimensions in the European Parliament can be identified in advance of the location of party groups, based on substantive expert understanding of potentially salient EU policy issues. The unknowns which experts are then asked to estimate are the locations of each party group on these a priori dimensions. The estimates of party group positions are then taken to be the statistically aggregated judgment of the experts, on each pre-defined dimension. Unlike factor analytic scorings, constructed scaled measures, or locations in a purely inductive space from multi-dimension scaling analyses, expert survey summaries eliminate the need for subjective and often ad hoc, a posteriori interpretation of results in terms of substantive policy scales.
A second reason to use expert surveys relates to their desirable statistical properties, namely the property that according to well-understood statistical rules, we can represent our uncertainty about our estimates of party group positions, on the basis of both the fundamental variability of party positions as measured by differences in expert judgments, and the estimation variability that is determined by sample size.
Finally, especially with regard to a rapidly evolving political institution as the EP, we regard experts as the single best source of political information on European party groups. This is because the behavioral benchmarks which might provide observable implications of party group policy positions are not only incompletely understood, but also constantly changing as the roles, powers, size, and composition of the European Parliament evolve. As we argue later in this paper, for instance, there is a potentially complex dynamic which maps policy preferences of constituent national parties into policy preferences of EP party groups, and it cannot be assumed that the latter can always be represented by the mean of the former.
Manifesto texts and roll-call votes may suffer from similar problems. Indeed, when trying to resolve which method of estimating party positions is best, we typically fall back on the expertise and wisdom of political experts. By extension, then, we see systematic collection of judgments of political experts on party locations as the best way to harvest systematically this wisdom, which will take into account all relevant information about a party group's position, including voting behavior, political speeches, debates, expressed opinions of party leaders, and so on. Even though experts will vary in their judgments, we can combine and summarize these judgments as a substantive indication of a party's likely set of policy locations. In short, our best estimate of European party group positions on policy resides in the collective wisdom of EU experts, available through systematically collected and summarized expert judgments.
An Expert Survey of EP Party Group Policy Positions
Our survey of experts was conducted from April to June 2004, at the time of the historic expansion eastward of the European Union to include 10 new member states and just before the June 2004 elections to the newly expanded European Parliament. Our expert survey solicited 36 experts on the European Union and the European Parliament drawn from professional directories and citation indices. These experts were largely academic specialists drawn from 32 different institutions in 12 different countries but also included a handful of European Parliament researchers who have published on the topic. Our survey system used individually sent, English-language e-mail solicitations containing a unique URL linking the respondent's solicitation e-mail to our on-line survey questionnaire website. The questionnaire itself was an interactive, on-line system linked to a database server which recorded respondent answers. Following an initial solicitation round on April 26, we sent a second round of request four weeks later to experts who had not yet responded. A total of 14 respondents completed questionnaires in the first round, and 10 more in the follow-up round, for a total of 24 respondents and an overall response rate of 67 %.
As in the Laver and Hunt survey, EP specialists were asked to use their best judgment to locate party groups on substantive policy dimensions. The party groups were the seven political groups existing in the European Parliament at the time of the survey. These groups and their abbreviations are listed in Table 1 , along with their share of the total EP seats. For some of the results we report below, we weight by seat share. While previous presentations of expert survey results (e.g. Laver and Hunt 1992, Benoit and Laver forthcoming) have weighted by vote share, the national-based, decentralized nature of EP elections makes computing the vote share of EP party groups a complicated exercise and we have opted for seat share instead, given that some variant of PR is used in all member states we do not believe this method will significantly distort results.
[ Table 1 about here]
Each policy dimension was titled in terms of its substantive content and anchored at each end by two short phrases setting out substantive policy positions. The survey provided respondents with a list of the European party groups (see Table 1 , excluding "Other") and asked respondents to locate each groups on a 20-point scale for 8 different substantive policy dimensions. Substantive policy dimensions covered in the survey included a set of four "core" dimensions deployed in every country in the Laver and Benoit study (forthcoming).
These were: increase spending v. reduce taxes; "social" policy; environmental policy; and decentralization. Also included, on the basis of advice from Parliament watchers, were policy dimensions dealing with, among other matters: immigration; deregulation; privatization; religion; treatment of former communists; media freedom; EU policy; security policy; health care; and foreign ownership of land. For instance, the question on economic deregulation In addition to locating each politically significant party on each scale, the questionnaire also asked respondents to indicate the relative importance of the issue to each party (also on a 1-20 point scale). This provides a position-independent measure of the salience of the issue for a particular party group, and may be used along with party group seat share to construct a measure of the overall political salience of a particular policy dimension.
Results: Policy positioning in the EP

Left-Right Positioning
A full statistical summary of the results of the expert locations of the party groups on each policy dimension is presented in Table 2 . The first row shows the mean score, followed by the standard error (SE), the standard deviation, and the number of respondents for each party on each dimension. The party groups are presented from left to right according to their mean values on the general left-right dimension, and are ranked following the left-right dimension by descending order of overall salience (see Table 3 below).
[ Table 2 about here]
At the far left of the political spectrum is the European United Left/Nordic Green Left (GUE), with a mean value of 3.6 (SE .51), followed by the Greens (Verts) at 5.1 (SE .36). The three largest party groups, the Party of European Socialists (PES), the European Liberal and Democrat Reform Party (ELDR), and the European People's Party (EPP) occupied positions on the left-of-centre, centre, and right-of-centre respectively. The PES scored 7.4 (SE .30), the ELDR 11.8 (SE .43) and the EPP 12.6 (SE .39). On the farther right appear the Union for a Europe of Nations (UEN), scoring 16.5 (.58), and the Group for a Europe of Democracies and Diversities (EDD) at 17.1 (SE .49).
In Figure 1 we illustrate these positions graphically. Each point represents a party's leftright mean judgment, and with the bars representing the 95% confidence interval. The left-right space appears to consist of four sets of party groups. First, the GUE and Verts appear on the far left, with a small degree of overlap in their 95% confidence intervals. Second, the PES inhabits the moderate centre left. Third, two political groups, the ELDR and the EPP, form a grouping with a substantial degree of overlap just right of the centre. Finally, the UEN and the EDD occupy the solid right position, with their positions being statistically indistinguishable.
[ Figure 1 about here]
Specific Policy Results
Looking further at Table 2 , we see more specific policy results for the party groupings. On the taxes v. spending economic dimension of policy, the rankings are the same from left to right as for the general left-right policy dimension, although there is both more variation (higher standard errors) and higher overlap. On taxes and spending, two groupings of parties whose estimated positions overlap one another appear: the GUE/Verts/PES on the left, and the ELDR, EPP, UEN, and EDD on the right. (We explore this pattern further below.) This broad grouping into economic left and economic right is matched by the results on deregulation, a result which we expect given the very high correlation between their mean scores (0.99).
On issues related to the authority and institutions of the European Union, we observe a pattern different from that of the economic left-right. On the pro-integration end of the spectrum, we find the PES and the ELDR most strongly supporting a federal vision of the European Union (mean 6.1 and 6.3 respectively), followed by the EPP (7.4) and the Greens (8.4). Positioned right at the centre of this issue is the GUE at 10.8. On the far right, preferring instead a union of nation-states, is the UEN and the EDD (16.6 and 19.9 respectively). On the EU Authority dimension, a very similar grouping of pro-European parties emerges. On the left end of the scale favouring increasing the areas in which the EU may set policy, we find the PES, Greens, EPP, and the ELDR being basically indistinguishable with mean scores ranging from 6.3 to 7.5. Once again the Greens are nearly at the centre at 9.5 (SE .82), and the UEN and EDD are found at the Euro-sceptic end favouring reducing the range of areas in which the EU may set policy (17.7 and 18.9 respectively). Quite similar results may be observed for the EU Collective Security dimension, with the PES once again emerging as the most strongly integrative, and the EDD the most Euro-sceptic.
Finally, we observe in Table 1 several non-economic dimensions of policy, such as social and moral issues, immigration and the environment. On the classic dimension of moral liberalism (measured by attitudes towards abortion, homosexuality and euthanasia), we see the EP divided into two distinct groups, one left of centre and one to the right. On the "left" of the spectrum, we find the Greens, GUE, ELDR, and the PES, with mean scores ranging 4.0-5.6 respectively. Closest to the centre but still distinctively right of centre is the EPP with a mean score of 13.9 (SE .58). Finally, the UEN and the EDD occupied their now familiar positions on the right, both with mean scores at 15.1. Very similar results were observed for immigration, with these same sets of parties divided into two similar camps, with the EPP once again closest to the centre at 12.0 (SE .70).
Finally, on the issue of the environment, party groups were generally less divided and more centrist. The exception was the Greens on the "left", meaning they favoured protecting the environment even at the cost of economic growth, with a mean score of 2.9. Left of centre were the GUE (6.9) and the PES (8.6), followed by the ELDR in the center at 10.9. The remaining parties EPP, UEN, and EDD were slightly to the right of centre at essentially the same positions (12.1, 12.8, and 12.9 respectively).
As measured by the Divergence column, we see that the policy dimensions where party positions were the most dispersed -indicating the policy dimensions with the highest degrees of policy differences between party groups -were first and foremost the classic economic and social left-right positions. Social policy had the highest position divergence, at 4.9, followed by Taxes v. Spending and Deregulation at 4.0 and 3.9 respectively. The three EU dimensions and also immigration ranged in the middle region of divergence between 3.2 and 3.9.
Interestingly the least contested policy dimension was the environment, with a divergence score of just 2.1.
Summarizing the positional information graphically, we can visualize the political parties in two dimensions using a two-dimensional plot of economic left-right versus positions on EU integration, the two most salient policy dimensions of taxes v. spending and EU federalism. Figure 2 portrays the main party groups in this two-dimension policy space, with each point representing the position mean on the two dimensions. The dashed lines indicate the nearest regions to each party, showing the midpoint lines between each set of adjacent points. This nearest-neighbourhood division of the space is known as a Voronoi tessellation and has been used to represent party policy in Laver and Hunt (1992) . Finally, the circles around each party group point are drawn proportional to the seat share of each group.
[Figure 2 about here]
Figure 2 confirms what we observed earlier, that the are two broad camps of economic parties, with GUE, Greens, and PES on the left, the ELDR and EPP right of centre, and the UEN and EDD farther to the right. On EU integration, we see a grouping of the PES, ELDR, EPP, and Greens on the pro-integration side, the GUE in the centre, and the UEN and the EDD on the Euro-sceptic side. In two dimensions, there appear to be three broad sets of parties: the PES, Greens and GUE on the left and pro-integration, the EPP and ELDR on the centre-right, pro-integration region, and the UEN and EDD in their own policy region of economic right and Euro-scepticism.
The EP Issue Space Relative Issue Salience
Expert respondents were also asked to indicate the relative importance of each policy dimension to each party group. Table 3 presents this information in the same format as Table   2 . In terms of overall importance, the economic (Taxes-Spending and Deregulation) and EU issues (Federalism, Authority, and Collective Security) were the most overall important, as indicated by their average across all parties, weighted by party seat share (scoring between 14.1 and 14.9). Immigration also ranked highly at 13.9. The Environment and Social Liberalism were ranked as the least important, at 12.7 and 12.5 respectively. Interestingly, these two dimensions were also the two that turned out to be (from Table 2 ) the most divisive (social) and the least divisive (environment).
[Table 3 about here]
A few expected results for individual parties stand out from Table 3 , such as the very high importance attached to the environment for the Greens. Also, it is interesting that for the UEN and EDD-the two right, Euro-sceptic party groups-the international issues were the most important, with other policy dimensions of only middling importance.
The components of left and right in the EP
The results summarized in Figure 2 seem to suggest that two broad dimensions of policy competition are present in the European Parliament. The first represents the classic national policy issues associated with left and right, namely economic and social liberalism, and also a bundle of relatively newer issues such as immigration and the environment. The second dimension relates to the authority and institutions of the European Union itself. Substantively, the question is whether the EU policy space is uni-dimensional or instead consists of two or possibly more dimensions. The EP policy space has previously been described as unidimensional with the traditional left-right or "regulation" dominating (Tsebelis and Garrett 2000; Kreppel and Tsebelis 1999) or one-dimensional with geo-political pressures defining the principal axis of competition (Hoffman 1966 , Moravcsik 1998 . Other scholars, however, have described the European policy space as consisting of two dimensions, a left-right dimension composed of economic and socio-political issues from the domestic arena, and an orthogonal dimension of EU integration versus national sovereignty (Hix and Lord 1997) .
Variations on the two-dimensional characterization relate to whether positions on EU integration are significantly correlated with left-right (e.g. Hooghe and Marks 2001, Gabel and Hix 2004) or whether positioning on the two dimensions is independent.
In Table 4 we have used principal components factor analysis to group and separate the So far, our analysis has looked only at the European Parliament level, yet there are important differences between the policy space at the EU level and the level of national political parties. As we demonstrate in our final section, the EU policy space is not simply a direct mapping of national patterns of party competition from the domestic to the supranational level. In the next section we take a first look at the degree to which policy competition between domestic political parties is congruent with party competition and affiliation at the EP level.
EP policy platforms and national member parties
One emerging area which students of politics in the European Union have only recently begun to explore relates to differences in policy competition at the national and EU levels. national and EU positions. We expect this dynamic between national politics and EU politics to form one of the more interesting topics in the study of party competition for future research.
Discussion
A broad range of empirical and spatial analyses in political science depend on the specification of the policy positions of political parties, covering topics as diverse as coalition formation, political representation, macro-economic policy development and legislative decision making. In this paper we have provided the first measure of such policy positions in the European Parliament using expert surveys. Given the changing political and institutional context of European party groups, we find the use of summaries of expert judgmentssystematic summaries of the collective wisdom of well-informed experts-to offer compelling advantages over other methods, especially inductive or indirect measurements.
While broadly consistent with the findings from recent placements based on roll call analyses (Hix et al. 2005) , for instance, our approach has the benefit of providing precise and direct numerical placements, on well-specified a priori dimensions of policy that do not need to be subject to uncertain, inductive interpretation.
Our results indicate that on the two most salient dimensions (taxes versus spending and EU federalism), there appear to be three broad sets of party blocs: the PES, Greens and GUE on the redistributive left and pro-integrationist in character; the EPP and ELDR on the centreright of the redistributive spectrum but broadly pro-integrationist; and finally the UEN and EDD in their own policy region on the economic right and distinctly Euro-sceptic on the EU federalism dimension.
Another central finding of this study is that the first dimension of policy space in the European Parliament strongly bundles with the traditional left-right axis of European party systems, principally socio-economic in nature but also incorporating newer issues such as immigration and the environment. In addition, we found strong evidence of a second axis of policy competition, orthogonal to the first, consisting of support for EU integration.
Finally, in order to examine the relationship between national parties and their European
Party parent groups we compared the estimated policy positions of the EP party groups with those of their domestic affiliates, and found that the EP political groups are generally placed at the centre of the distribution of domestic party policy positions. These intriguing preliminary results suggest a remarkably close correspondence between the EP groups and national political parties and point to interesting possibilities for future research on the dynamic between national and European policy positioning. Note: Dashed lines indicate policy neighbourhoods, circle size is proportional to vote share. EU Integration is "EU Federalism" dimension, Economic Policy is "Taxes and Spending" dimension. 
